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FOOD SAFETY AND SECURITY IN THE MONSANTO 
ERA:  PEERING THROUGH THE LENS OF A RIGHTS 
PARADIGM AGAINST AN ONSLAUGHT OF 
CORPORATE DOMINATION 
Saby Ghoshray* 
EDITOR’S NOTE 
Just prior to going to print with Volume 65, No. 2, the United States Supreme 
Court, in Bowman v. Monsanto, No. 11-796 (May 13, 2013), held that the doctrine 
of patent exhaustion does not grant a farmer the right to reproduce patented seed 
without the patent holder’s prior authorization.  The facts of the case are a key 
analytical tool in Dr. Ghoshray’s essay, below.  Although the author does not 
specifically examine the Court’s very recent ruling, he nonetheless examines the 
policy implications of the predicted ruling and discusses its consequences.  For this 
reason, the Editorial Board has agreed to publish this essay in its current form. 
Monsanto should not have to vouchsafe the safety of biotech foods . . . .  Our 
interest is in selling as much of it as possible.  Assuring its safety is the F.D.A.’s 
job. – Phil Angell1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since our earliest ancestors’ desire for a better hunting weapon to procure food 
or a better storage facility to avoid spoilage, food safety and security has shaped 
human social and technological evolution like no other essential element.  The need 
to procure food has shaped our civilization since the first human graced our planet.  
Food continues to be a pivotal force in humankind’s saga of life and death.  Yet, 
despite stratospheric progress in scientific application surrounding food, food 
security and safety for all citizens continues to elude mankind.  Why do some enjoy 
a feast, while others suffer in a famine?  This essay will consider this very 
disturbing characteristic of human civilization from an American legal perspective.  
 The critical place of food in the continuation of human existence manifests 
itself in countless forms of human endeavors that animate mankind’s quest for food 
                                                                                                     
 *  My scholarship focuses on subsets of International Law, Constitutional Law, Law & Policy, 
and Human Rights Law, among others.  I would like to thank Jennifer Schulke for her assistance in legal 
research and typing of the manuscript.  Also to my beautiful children, Shreyoshi and Sayantan, I owe 
much for their patience and understanding. I offer much appreciation to the members of the Maine Law 
Review Editorial Board for their thoughtful suggestions and dedication in the edit process. Finally, as 
the march of civilization continues to reshape the traditional way of farm life around the world, I 
dedicate this work to those who have tilled our land, grew our crops and harvested our milk – like the 
dairy farmers Walter and Martha Schulke of Galva, Iowa. 
 1.  Michael Pollan, Playing God in the Garden, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1998 (quoting Phil Angell, 
Monsanto’s director of corporate communications), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/25/magazine/playing-god-in-the-
garden.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
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security.2  To many, within their sociological context, food is also sacred and 
sublime.  Witnessed through the behavioral construct of many cultures, food is 
revered—even offered to gods and goddesses prior to consumption.3  Yet, as the 
false promise of food security ushered in an era of advanced biotechnology 
applications for food generation, food security has virtually disappeared into the 
labyrinth of mass corporatization.  
Despite unprecedented scientific advancement4 and technological 
sophistication,5 safety and security continues to elude man’s quest for food.6  Even 
the über-advanced Western civilization suffers from this paradox.  This essay 
attempts to explain this paradox by examining food security and safety in the U.S. 
through two distinct legal paradigms: biotechnology regulation and intellectual 
property law.  
With this objective in mind, I will make some observations related to food 
safety and security in the U.S. in Section II.  This leads to a discussion of the 
regulatory landscape of biotechnology seeds in Section III, where I identify the 
regulatory framework’s fragmented status and the cause of inertia within the 
current system.  In Section IV, I make some further observations about the current 
patent framework’s contribution to the evolving menace of transgenic pollution, 
paving the way for a peek at the microcosm represented by the pending Supreme 
Court case of Bowman v. Monsanto in Section V.  In Section VI, I offer 
commentary on a much less discussed narrative for food law in the U.S.—one 
which recognizes the linkages between and weaknesses of the two frameworks.  I 
conclude, in Section VII, by noting that at the heart of the food security problem in 
America is the missing recognition of fundamental human rights for all individuals, 
which, when taken in conjunction with the existing legal modalities provides a 
                                                                                                     
 2.  The story of humankind marches on only because of food.  This relationship was formalized by 
The World Food Summit in 1996.  At this Summit, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared that 
food security is defined as “when all people at all times have access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to 
maintain a healthy and active life.”  Food Security, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story028/en/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2013). 
 3.  See A CROSSROADS OF FREEDOM:  THE 1912 CAMPAIGN SPEECHES OF WOODROW WILSON 356 
(John Wells Davidson ed., 1956) (“I have often reflected that there was a very human order in the 
petitions in our Lord's Prayer.  For we pray first of all, ‘Give us this day our daily bread,’ knowing that 
it is useless to pray for spiritual graces on an empty stomach . . . .”).  Food has been deeply rooted 
within humankind’s religious traditions.  As author Devdutt Pattanaik states, “[f]ood is essential to 
existence, and to the religious experience as well.  Every religion has rituals where food is offered to the 
worshipped, shared, eaten, or even tabooed.”  Devdutt Pattanaik, God-Food for God, LIFE POSITIVE, 
http://www.lifepositive.com/Spirit/god/food.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2013). 
 4.  See generally FAO/WHO Expert Meeting on the Application of Nanotechnologies in the Food 
and Agriculture Sectors:  Potential Food Safety Implications (World Health Org., Meeting Report 
2010), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/i1434e/i1434e00.pdf; Improving Access to 
Agricultural Information, Food & Agric. Org., 1st Consultation on Agric. Info. Mgmt. Working 
Document (June 5-7, 2000), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/x7035e.htm. 
 5.  See Derek Heady & Olivier Ecker, Improving the Measurement of Food Security (Int’l Food 
Policy Research Inst., Discussion Paper No. 01225, Nov. 2012), available at 
http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/ifpridp01225.pdf. 
  6.  See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., The State of Food Insecurity in the World, at Key Messages (2012) 
available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i3027e/i3027e.pdf.  (“[T]he number of people suffering 
from chronic undernourishment is still unacceptably high, and eradication of hunger remains a major 
global challenge.”). 
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better interpretation of food law.  This illumination can then be used to frame the 
dialogue surrounding the future of food safety and security in the U.S.  
II.  THE PARADOX OF FOOD SAFETY AND SECURITY IN THE U.S. 
Food security continues to be elusive in underdeveloped countries, where 
human lives are routinely lost due to food scarcity.7  Ironically, in the more 
illuminated West, lives are increasingly put in peril, as the strong undercurrent of 
political acquiescence emphasizes corporate interest over consumer rights.   If the 
former scenario is an assault on human dignity, the latter must be seen as an affront 
to mankind’s vaunted advancement.  Both, however, are fundamental constraints to 
human development that compel us to consider fundamental rights within food 
policies.8  From a human rights paradigm, the right to food must be equated with 
the right to water and, therefore, can be located within the spectrum of fundamental 
human right as I have explored elsewhere.9  This essay does not set to establish a 
fundamental right to food safety and security; however, an understanding of such 
rights is important in deconstructing the failed food framework in the U.S.  For the 
time being, this essay sidesteps that issue and instead focuses on the paradox of 
food safety and security in the West.  Within the limited scope of this essay, I 
simply aim to explore the legal framework that animates the current status of food 
safety in the U.S.  
To trace the paradox within the U.S. food framework, I begin by noting the 
apparent technological superiority of America’s production framework, its well-
managed supply chain, and abundance of resources.  Yet, the much anticipated 
boon of a sustainable food security never materialized.10  This is so for two 
reasons:  first, the burgeoning stress over food safety can be traced to an inadequate 
regulatory paradigm11 and, second, the crack in the armory of food security is a 
product of misapplied identification of intellectual property rights, leading to 
                                                                                                     
 7.  The lack of food access and citizens’ struggle for survival are evident in many parts of the 
globe.  One example is the Horn of Africa, which faces starvation and famine at staggering rates.  See 
generally EUR. COMM’N JOINT RESEARCH CENTRE, Food Security Bulletin:  Special Issue – Horn of 
Africa (July 30, 2011), available at 
http://mars.jrc.ec.europa.eu/mars/content/download/2215/11653/file/MARS_FoodSecurityBulletin_Hor
nOfAfrica_July2011.pdf. 
 8. The drive to declare food as a fundamental right has found its way into many significant 
documents.  See Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that “[e]veryone 
has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, 
including food . . . .”  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) art. 25 (Dec. 10, 1948).  See also Luisa Cruz, Social Protection and the Right to Food 
(Food & Agric. Org., Right to Food Policy Brief No. 3, 2012), available at 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/017/ap601e/ap601e.pdf. 
 9. See generally Saby Ghoshray, Searching for Human Rights to Water Amidst Corporate 
Privatization in India:  Hindustan Coca-Cola Pvt. Ltd. v. Perumatty Grama Panchayat, 39 GEO. INT'L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 643 (2007). 
 10. A recent USDA report found that in 2011, 14.9% of U.S. households “were food insecure at 
least some time during the year . . . .”  See Alisha Coleman-Jensen, et al., Household Food Security in 
the United States in 2011, USDA Report from the Economic Research Serv. (Sept. 2012), available at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/884525/err141.pdf. 
 11. See infra Section II.   
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inefficiency within the paradigm.12  This essay interjects further interpretive gloss 
to deconstruct food security and safety from this dual framework.   
By the end of the twentieth century, biotechnology’s arrival in the scientific 
firmament was heralded with great anticipation.13  Embedded within technology’s 
excitement was the promise of solving the world’s food scarcity problem once and 
for all.14  That promise remains unfulfilled and this lofty expectation has been 
replaced with uncertainty on two grounds:15  (1) the inability of federal food safety 
regulations to cope with the growing sophistication of biotechnology has allowed 
genetically modified (GM) crops to flood the food system, and (2) the efficient 
utilization of intellectual property law’s loopholes by technology companies has 
provided fertile ground to consolidate the food production (seed) industry.16  In 
sum, rampant usage of genetic engineering17 and tinkering with bio-pesticides18 has 
                                                                                                     
 12. See infra Section III. 
 13. See GM Food:  Head to Head, BBC NEWS (May 18, 1999), available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/1999/02/99/food_under_the_microscope/278490.stm (“The 
key benefits from this new technology are food security—there is a need to double food supply by 2025 
due to population increases, changes in diets and natural disasters brought about by climate change.”). 
 14. See id. 
 15. This essay is prompted by an observation that, in the context of consumers’ protection from 
food-related risks, the required high level of protection of human life, health and the protection of 
consumers’ interests is not adequate in the U.S.  Besides a general lack of fair practices in food trade, a 
micro-level risk analysis in food law and a requisite risk assessment based on independent, objective, 
and transparent scientific evidence is somewhat lacking.  As a result, uncertainty persists in a wide range 
of sub-sectors within the broader food law framework.  Scientific uncertainty continues to exist in 
identifying and establishing harmful effects on health from genetically engineered food, in application 
of bio-pesticides in crop and in detecting adulteration of food.  See Doug Farquhar & Liz Meyer, State 
Authority to Regulate Biotechnology under the Federal Coordinated Framework, 12 DRAKE J. AGRIC. 
L. 439, 442-43 (2007). 
 16. See KRISTINA HUBBARD, FARMER TO FARMER CAMPAIGN ON GENETIC ENG’G, OUT OF HAND:  
FARMERS FACE THE CONSEQUENCES OF A CONSOLIDATED SEED INDUSTRY 13, 16 (Dec. 2009), 
available at http://farmertofarmercampaign.com/Out%20of%20Hand.FullReport.pdf.   
 17. Genetic Engineering (GE) in the context of food production can be defined as crops produced 
by extracting genes from one species and inserting them into another using recombinant DNA (rDNA) 
technology.  Genetic Engineering is also referred to as the process to develop transgenic or genetically 
modified organisms (GMO).  Besides the gene or DNA fragments for the desired characteristics, genetic 
engineering inserts “markers” which are used to determine if the desired characteristic was successfully 
inserted and “promoters” that force such desired characteristics to express their protein(s) at all times.  
Genetic Engineering is not the same as conventional breeding and has been in vogue for barely a quarter 
century.  Despite FDA scientists determining that GMO crops carry unique risks and should be 
regulated differently, the regulatory framework has remained behind scientific innovation in such a 
vitally important area.  See generally Completed Consultations on Bioengineered Foods, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN. (last updated Aug. 31, 2012), available at 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/fcn/fcnNavigation.cfm?rpt=bioListing; see also Michael Bennett 
Homer, Frankenfish  . . . It’s What’s for Dinner:  The FDA, Genetically Engineered Salmon, and the 
Flawed Regulation of Biotechnology, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 83 (2011).  
 18. See Charles M. Benbrook, Genetically Engineered Crops and Pesticide Use in the United 
States:  The First Nine Years (Bio Tech Info Net, Technical Paper No. 7, Oct. 2004), available at 
http://organic.insightd.net/reportfiles/Full_first_nine.pdf; see also DENNIS T. AVERY, SAVING THE 
PLANET WITH PESTICIDES AND PLASTICS:  THE ENVIRONMENTAL TRIUMPH OF HIGH-YIELD FARMING 
(2d ed. 2000). 
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presented the risk of diseases creeping in through transgenic pathways,19 posing a 
real danger within the food distribution system.20  
Inadequate regulation since the 1980s has allowed corporate interests to 
predominate the consumer food crop in the U.S.21  An abundance of GM crops 
began flooding the U.S. food chain without adequately analyzing the long-term 
effects of consumption of GM crops on human health and the natural 
environment.22  The failure to enact procedural safeguards to adequately balance 
the cost to human and environmental health against the benefit of production 
efficiency has only inflated corporate profit at the expense of human health and 
environmental degradation.  As a result, the pursuit of food security faces an 
uncertain future.  In the absence of a robust consumer rights framework, both 
farmers and consumers are heading into a future replete with unsafe and insecure 
food.23    Moreover, if the federal regulatory framework continues to rely on arcane 
federal laws, without incorporating modern research on biotechnology 
applications’ adverse impacts on environmental, ecological, and human health, the 
threats to food safety will worsen.  
These threats are exemplified by the unknown effects of the use of bio-
pesticides.   There exists a pervasive use of genetic engineering in consumer food 
crops where the genetic makeup of crop seeds are tinkered with, often times, to 
eliminate undesirable traits found in nature and at times to make them resistant to 
bio-pesticides.  Such bio-engineered food could cause undesirable, poisonous, and 
disease-prone impacts as a result of unknown and uncertain chemical compositions, 
which have been left largely unregulated in the food supply chain.24  This safety 
issue is the product of an inadequate and fragmented regulatory framework that is 
currently overseeing the entire food procurement value chain. Why this regulatory 
framework suffers from the inertia of moving lockstep with technology’s 
advancement is discussed next.  
                                                                                                     
 19. See Ricki M. Helm, Food Biotechnology:  Is This Good Or Bad?  Implications To Allergic 
Diseases, 90 ANNALS OF ALLERGY, ASTHMA, & IMMUNOLOGY 90-98 (June 2003), available at 
http://cib.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/estudos_alimentares05.pdf. 
 20. See Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 15. 
 21. See discussion infra Section VI. 
 22. See generally, Nina V. Fedoroff, The Past, Present and Future of Crop Genetic Modification 27 
NEW BIOTECHNOLOGY 461, available at http://www.cemus.uu.se/dokument/UAG2011/sdarticle-14.pdf. 
 23. See Mairi Anne Mackenzie, Industry Reaps GM Bonanza, but We Will Pay, THE AGE (Apr. 15, 
2006), http://www.theage.com.au/news/business/industry-reaps-gm-bonanza-but-we-will-
pay/2006/04/14/1144521507502.html (noting how GM technology has given rise to an environment that 
has not only changed our way of life but has also created a sense of deep-rooted anxiety of over safety 
and security of food we consume); see also Hubbard, supra note 16. 
 24. See Miroslaw, Maluszynski et al., Application Of In Vivo And In Vitro Mutation Techniques For 
Crop Improvement, 85 EUPHYTICA, 303 (1995) (commenting on the various genetic engineering 
techniques developed for crop enhancement that relies on changing mutation rates, the future 
implications of which are not very clear); see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SAFETY OF GENETICALLY 
ENGINEERED FOODS:  APPROACHES TO ASSESSING UNINTENDED HEALTH EFFECTS (2004) (questioning the 
adequate safeguard against the astounding development of more than 2300 different crop varieties using 
radiation based mutation). 
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  III.  THE REGULATORY LANDSCAPE FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY SEEDS 
The current state of food safety in the U.S. calls for modernization of the 
federal regulatory framework that oversees the application of biotechnology to crop 
seeds, especially GM crops.  Despite the enactment of the 2011 Food and Safety 
Modernization Act,25 the regulation of the U.S. food distribution framework does 
not depend on direct supervisory authority that stems from an applicable statute.  
Rather, biotechnology regulation in the U.S. emanates from a manipulative 
paradigm of regulatory authority based on an innovative interpretation of the 
Federal Food Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA).26  In its capacity as sole 
responsible supervisory entity in charge of regulating GM crops, the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA)27 gains its authority to regulate GM crops through a 
fragmented approach.  
The FDA’s lack of expertise in dealing with agricultural, ecological, and 
environmental concerns is well-documented and discussed widely by reputable 
scientists in the field.  Yet, as a result of creative interpretation of the FDCA, the 
FDA continues to be the sole regulator of biotechnology-driven food in the U.S.28  
Over the course of more than three decades of regulating relevant biotechnology 
products in the agricultural arena, the FDA has continually failed to incorporate 
timely enhancements in law based on technology’s advancements. This inability to 
adequately plug all the regulatory loopholes prevents the agency from addressing 
the possible adverse consequences that may arise out of the biotechnological 
interplay between food crops and chemical pesticides.  
  The above scenario seems to reveal a deeply ingrained inertia within the 
regulatory framework of biotechnology-driven food crops in the U.S.  What is the 
root cause of such inertia?  Looking into the regulatory landscape, the existing 
flaws within the federal regulatory system for GM crops emanate from a 
fundamental weakness within the “Coordinated Framework,”—the original 
backbone of the regulatory structure.29  At the dawn of the U.S. biotechnology 
industry in the 1980s, there was a severe lack of applicable statutes relevant to this 
new technology.  This created an ambience of confusion and inadequacy amongst 
federal regulatory agencies.30  Confusion and recognition of inadequacy gave way 
to vulnerability in dealing with new challenges, and thus the agencies sought a 
                                                                                                     
 25. See Helena Bottemiller, The Food Safety Modernization Act – One Year Later, FOOD SAFETY 
NEWS, Jan. 20, 2012, http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/01/the-food-safety-modernization-act-one-
year-later. 
 26. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 393 (Westlaw current through P.L. 112-207). 
 27. See Mike Zelina et al, The Health Effects of Genetically Engineered Crops on San Luis Obispo 
County: A Citizen Response to the SLO Health Commission GMO Task Force Report, (May 2006) 
available at 
http://www.slocounty.ca.gov/Assets/PH/HealthCommission/GMOTaskForce/Citizen+Response+on+the
+Health+Effects+of+GE+Crops.pdf. 
 28. See Homer, supra note 17, at 99-101. 
 29. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June 26, 1986). 
 30. See THE PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD & BIOTECHNOLOGY, GUIDE TO U.S. REGULATION OF 
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS 5 (Sept. 2001), 
available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Food_and_Biotechnology/hhs_biot
ech_0901.pdf. 
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creative solution in envisioning a collaborative framework. 
The idea of a collaborative framework resulted in a regulatory paradigm that 
was coordinated on paper, but heavily fragmented in its approach due to the 
overlapping responsibilities with which the various federal regulatory agencies 
were entrusted.  This overlapping jurisdiction was a result of inadequate 
infrastructures trying to catch up to technological innovations.  Unfortunately, 
attempts to add teeth to the regulatory framework via legislative enactment did not 
find currency in circulation. 
Overlapping jurisdiction created a highly susceptible framework, manifested in 
each agency’s disparate approach to biotechnology issues that the framework had 
not envisioned at inception.31  Inadequate knowledge and an incomplete 
understanding of the scope and future of biotechnology prompted the 
administration’s Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)32 to formulate 
the Coordinated Framework in 1986.  More than a quarter century later, OSTP 
continues to be the focal point of supervisory oversight related to biotechnology 
regulatory scheme for food crops.33  
Unfortunately, the Coordinated Framework suffers from a mismatch between 
its stated objective and the various approaches of its member agencies.  The 
Framework continues to be burdened by escalating advancement of technological 
innovation.  This has resulted in sub-optimal oversight. This is due in part to lack 
of requisite regulatory knowledge and also in part to fragmented oversight that has 
failed to ensure the safety of biotechnology products.  Moreover, the Framework 
has suffered from implementation disconnects and compliance difficulties even as 
it attempts to lay the foundation for future decades of policy and regulation.34  
Thus, despite an abundance of regulatory agencies, the fundamental problem 
remains unsolved.  In its current paradigm, the Coordinated Framework does not 
distribute regulatory responsibilities based on any exhibited expertise.  It does not 
delegate supervisory responsibility based on any specificity of purpose.  The 
agencies draw regulatory authority based on faulty statutory interpretations that 
attempt to force-fit new, evolving, and increasingly sophisticated issues into old 
statutes.35  This is because the regulatory responsibility belonging to any given 
regulatory agency is derived from the statutory mandates of that particular 
agency,36 and these mandates may not comport with evolving complexities that 
automatically come with new technology.  In this context, decades-old law simply 
cannot do justice, as it lacks the process-specific regulatory authority. Moreover, 
within the existing regulatory framework, there exists no singular statute that 
specifically addresses biotechnology.  Similarly, there is no dedicated federal 
agency that regulates biotechnology.  
                                                                                                     
 31. Id. 
 32. See Homer, supra note 17, at 100. 
 33. See id. at 100-02. 
 34. Id. at 101-103; see also discussion, infra Part VI. 
 35. See PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, ISSUES IN THE REGULATION OF 
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED PLANTS AND ANIMALS 10–11 (2004), available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Food_and_Biotechnology/food_bio
tech_regulation_0404.pdf. 
 36. Id. 
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Regulatory agencies’ creative manufacturing of authority based on arcane 
statutes is a reflection of attempts to create the illusion of adequacy and capability 
of oversight.  These agencies’ constant struggle to legitimize their oversight 
functions related to the delegated areas is a strong indication of a deep-rooted 
weakness within the current regulatory framework.  Yet, a closer look reveals how 
these agencies have prevailed over the years while continuing to do a sub-optimal 
job of regulating in complex areas within the U.S. food procurement and 
distribution system.  I shall briefly review the functionalities of these agencies and 
the various legislatives enactments that these agencies utilize in order to justify 
their oversight functionalities.  A look at various agencies and their stated 
functionalities will also reveal the inadequacies in their oversight.  
First, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)37 oversees GM 
products that could adversely impact agriculture.  Yet, the basic responsibility of 
the USDA has not changed since the original introduction of the coordinated 
framework.38  Second, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)39 is in charge 
of regulating environmental risk.  However, the agency has been delegated to 
measuring and managing adverse impacts of GM crops that are engineered to 
express natural pesticides.  Third, the FDA is tasked with evaluating food safety 
issues of all biotechnologically-derived and genetically modified products for 
human consumption.40  In this regard, the FDA has the responsibility of ensuring 
food safety for all food products—a responsibility jointly shared with the USDA.  
While the FDA, through the FDCA,41 exercises its jurisdiction over biotechnology-
based products, including food crops, specificity with respect to biotechnology 
regulation is conspicuously absent from both the agency task definition and its own 
interpretation of the Act. 
For example, the FDA is authorized to regulate only adulterated foods through 
Section 342 of the FDCA.42  The controlling authority of the FDA comes from the 
statutory provision defining adulterated foods as that which “[b]ears or contains 
any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health.”43  
This language neither compels nor encourages the manufacturers of biotechnology-
based food products to research adverse ramifications or potential hazardous 
implications of genetic modification.  Rather, the onus of analyzing any poisonous 
or deleterious effects is clearly the domain of the agency.  By implication, 
therefore, absent the FDA’s intervention, the current regulatory framework does 
not provide a clear mandate for a biotechnology food producer to be extra vigilant 
                                                                                                     
 37. See generally Statement of Policy:  Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 
22,984 (May 29, 1992). 
 38. Id.  See also generally Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps:  
Crisis in the Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167, 
2174-75 (2004). 
 39. See Statement of Policy, supra note 37. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 393 (Westlaw current through P.L. 112-207). 
 42. 21 U.S.C.A. § 342(a)(1).  “Food” is defined as “(1) articles used for food or drink for man or 
other animals, (2) chewing gum, and (3) articles used for components of any such article.”  § 321(f).  
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articles.  21 C.F.R. § 170.3(m) (Westlaw Current through January 31, 2013). 
 43. 21 U.S.C.A. § 342. 
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towards consumer food safety.  
Scientific research is unanimous in its observation that the specter of injury to 
human health, environment, and ecology resulting from the recombination, 
replacement, and substitution of genetic profile44 is a far more dangerous 
possibility than that created from the mere presence of poison or pesticide.  This is 
readily perceivable and scientifically supported, yet the FDA regulates GM 
products within the same framework applicable to the common pesticide. 
Another creative way the FDA attempts to regulate biotechnology derived 
food is by craftily manipulating the statutory meaning of the FDCA term, “food 
additives.”45  Section 348 regulates food additives by controlling the functional 
implications of components within food that can render food adulterated.46  Thus, 
whenever food contains a component that might be seen as an additive within the 
meaning of the Act, it automatically triggers FDA oversight.47  Despite the ability 
to bring biotechnology products under the FDA’s regulatory ambit for federally 
mandated purposes using this definition, this methodology is inherently flawed as it 
does not delineate between food additives that are biotechnology-derived and those 
that are not.  
Similarly, from a component definition point of view, FDCA Section 321 
defines “food additives” as any substance that is intended for human consumption, 
may reasonably be expected to become a component of food, or may in any 
meaningful way affect the characteristic of food.48  Yet, none of these 
functionalities, product definitions, or prohibitory mechanisms directly addresses 
GM food crops.  This leaves a huge regulatory gap and a loophole for corporate 
manipulation as and when needed. 
 Stepping away from food additives, it is apparent that there remains natural 
disconnects within the regulatory ambit of the FDA, largely driven by imprecise 
articulation within the statutory pronouncements of the FDCA.  Similarly, 
vagueness within the FDA’s policy statements has presented significant 
implementation difficulties.  Perhaps no other regulatory pronouncement has 
caused more damage in the field of food safety than the FDA’s 1992 policy 
statement that genetically engineered crops “have been widely recognized and 
accepted as safe.”49  This policy statement has kept many GE crops outside the 
regulatory ambit of food additives regulation pursuant to Sections 348 and 321 of 
the FDCA.50  Moreover, its broader implications could be devastating for food 
safety. 
To support its 1992 policy statement, the FDA applied a flawed scientific 
component-level analysis of genetically engineered crops. According to the FDA, 
genetically engineered crops containing only nucleic acids as the active additional 
                                                                                                     
 44. See Homer, supra note 17, at 94, 96-99. 
 45. 21 U.S.C.A. § 321(s). 
 46. Id. § 348(a)(2). 
 47. Statement of Policy:  Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 (May 29, 
1992). 
 48. 21 U.S.C.A. § 321(s). 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. §§ 321(s), 348(a)(2) . 
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components are kept outside of the agency’s regulatory ambit.51  By extolling the 
virtues of nucleic acid as essential to human existence, the FDA attempted to allay 
any safety concerns consumers might have.  This misapplied interpretation of 
human biology is a result of faulty understanding of nucleic acid functionality, 
regardless of whether nucleic acid is taken in isolation or in collaboration with 
other elements.  The scientific details of this analysis are beyond the scope of this 
essay, and I shall not belabor this argument further except to note that the FDA’s 
argument is inconsistent with scientific viewpoints that have support in the 
literature.52  Following a faulty chain of logic, the FDA thus erroneously 
transferred the responsibility of food safety to the food producers.53  Accordingly, it 
is the producer who must now determine whether a food additive is generally 
recognized as safe or should be further scrutinized.  
It is instructive to note that the FDA applies a much higher standard of review 
for conventional food sources and supplies, and their adverse implications have 
been well studied.  In this context, it is hard to reason that the implications of 
biotechnology-derived products are poorly understood.  Yet, the FDA continues to 
evade responsibility, and acquiesces to the wishes and manipulations by the very 
entities that produce genetically engineered food products and crops.  Clearly, by 
shifting the onus of regulation from the agency to the producer, federal agencies 
have failed the consumer.  The FDA’s recommendation of voluntary consultation 
and review of genetically engineered food products and crops54 alleviates it from 
the burdensome responsibility of developing robust standards to regulate GE crops.  
This colossal policy failure in the entire regulatory infrastructure has not come 
by happenstance; rather, it is the culmination of long-standing policy inertia.  The 
lack of a comprehensive regulatory framework for genetically engineered crops 
poses a dangerous food safety framework for consumers. Absent review and 
regulation by the federal agencies, consumers cannot be protected from human 
consumption risks attendant to GE crops. Absent from current regulations and 
federal reviews of biotechnology-derived products is any acknowledgment of 
consumer rights,55 or any consideration of risks related to ecological disaster,56 
environmental degradation,57 biodiversity contamination,58 or geological 
                                                                                                     
 51. See Statement of Policy, supra note 47, at 22,990. 
 52. See Zelina, supra note 27. 
 53. See Statement of Policy, supra note 47, at 22,991 (“Ultimately, it is the food producer that is 
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 54. See Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 12 (Jan. 18 2001).  See 
also William Freese and David Schubert, Safety Testing and Regulation of Genetically Engineered 
Foods, 21 BIOTECHNOLOGY & GENETIC ENGINEERING REVS. 299, 299-324 (2004), available at 
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 56. See Mandel, supra note 38, at 2196-98; see also John Tuxill, Nature’s Cornucopia: Our Stake 
in Plant Diversity (Worldwatch Paper 148, Sept. 1999). 
 57. Id. 
 58. 20 Questions On Genetically Modified (Gm) Foods, WORLD HEALTH ORG. question 3(2013), 
http://www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/biotech/20questions/en; see also Rick A. Relyea, The 
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ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 618-27 (2005), available at 
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contamination.59 
IV.  PATENT EXCLUSIVITY AND TRANSGENIC POLLUTION  
While the regulatory agencies have been napping at the wheel for the last three 
decades, biotechnology giants have found fertile ground to extend their control 
over the U.S. food system.  The lack of robust and meaningful biotechnology 
regulation was the perfect precursor for corporate behemoths like Monsanto to 
make further inroads into controlling the U.S. food production, which in turn has 
allowed them to significantly shape both farming practices and consumer habits. In 
this context, Monsanto’s manipulation of U.S. patent law to control use of staple 
seeds by farmers provides a lens through which to understand the interplay between 
food security and intellectual property.  
Because of the faulty imposition of patent law,60 and at times flawed 
interpretation of traditional patent doctrine,61 food sources in America have become 
institutionalized and consolidated—and ostensibly hijacked—by a few corporate 
giants.62  This has been accomplished through a series of heavy-handed 
investigations,63 often followed by unscrupulous settlements64 and at times through 
zealous prosecutions by the biotechnology giants.  The current patent framework 
surrounding food crops seems to have only aided corporate interests.65  The 
                                                                                                     
 59. See Katherine K. Donegan & Ramon J. Seidler, Effects of Transgenic Plants on Soil and Plant 
Microorganisms, 3 RECENT RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENTS IN MICROBIOLOGY 415-24 (1999). 
 60. See Richard P. Rozek, The Effects of Compulsory Licensing on Innovation and Access to Health 
Care, 3 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 889, 889-91 (2000); see also Richard P. Rozek & Renee L. Rainey, 
Broad-Based Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceutical Technologies:  Unsound Public Policy, 4 J. OF 
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 463, 470-72 (2001). 
 61. See Brief for Amici Curiae Food Safety and Save Our Seeds in Support of Petitioner 20-22, 
Bowman v. Monsanto Co. No. 11-796 (2013), available at http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/wp-
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 62. See DANIEL CHARLES, LORDS OF THE HARVEST 201 (2001); see also DAVID MOELLER & 
MICHAEL SLIGH, FARMERS’ GUIDE TO GMOS 8 (2004).  This observation is consistent with published 
data that reveals that, as of 2001, Monsanto was responsible for seed technology for over 90% of world 
genetically engineered crop production.  See David R. Nicholson, Agricultural Biotechnology and 
Genetically-Modified Foods:  Will the Developing World Bite?, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 7 (2003).  
Additional data indicate that Monsanto has been consistently controlling seed technology at around 
90%.   See CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, MONSATO VS. U.S. FARMERS 57 (2005), available at 
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/pubs/CFSMOnsantovsFarmerReport1.13.05.pdf . 
 63. See Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Monsanto’s Harvest of Fear, VANITY FAIR (May 
2008), http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/05/monsanto200805.   
 64. Monsanto’s unparalleled resources have caused a trail of terror across America’s heartland, 
where the cost to the farmers has continued to devastate families.  See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Thomason, 
No. 97-01454 (W.D. La. filed July 23, 1997) (awarding $447,797.05 to Respondents and $222,748.00 to 
Delta Pine in damages; $279,741.00 in attorney fees and $57,469.13 in costs to Respondents; 
$82,281.75 in attorney fees and $5,801.00 in costs to Delta Pine; and $75,545.83 for testing fields); see 
also Agricultural Giant Battles Small Farmers, CBS NEWS (Jan. 4, 2011, 10:00AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-4048288.html; Greenpeace Austl., How Monsanto Put This 
Farmer in Court over GE Seed, YOUTUBE (Mar. 12, 2009), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Us42DZO0NX0. 
 65. See Mike Masnick, Monsanto Wins Patent Dispute Against Farmer Who Bought Legal Seeds, 
TECHDIRT, (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110927/01185716104/monsanto-wins-
patent-dispute-against-farmer-who-bought-legal-seeds.shtml (pointing to the vagueness in patent 
framework in determining delineation of patentability between the first and second generation of seeds). 
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resulting ambience of pervasive panic amongst U.S. farmers66 and an extreme 
sense of uncertainty among consumers67 have created a deep apathy and resentment 
toward corporate food producers among food growers.68  
Specifically, manipulation of the patent framework by corporate patent holders 
who have nearly perfected the art of genetic engineering for plant development has 
resulted in country-wide patent infringement litigations brought by patent holders 
against farmers who save patented seeds.69  By falling on the wrong side of the 
intellectual property paradigm on account of illegitimate application of patented 
and proprietary technology, seed breeders and farmers have faced significant 
liability.70  Thus, biotechnology’s promise of the 1980s as the gateway towards a 
sustainable food system has instead turned into a pervasive headache for both 
consumers and farmers.71  
Despite heightened expectations, agricultural biotechnology has neither 
produced enhanced yields nor eradicated the world hunger.  However, like a 
runaway freight train, once descended upon the scene, commercialization of 
biotechnology has continued transforming U.S. farming landscape.  Extracting 
exclusivity via its patents, Monsanto’s genetically engineered seeds currently 
dominate U.S. farming practices for various commodity crops.  This unbridled 
commercialization and naked corporate monopoly has a dark side that has not been 
taken into consideration in granting Monsanto such unprecedented exclusivity. 
Commercialization of biotechnology-driven food crops has given rise to mass 
production and distribution of patented transgenic crops.  As evidenced in a variety 
of commodity crops, some of these transgenic crops can produce insecticides, and a 
few are capable of withstanding herbicide application.  For example, Monsanto has 
utilized genetic engineering to develop and patent its Roundup Ready (RR)72 crops, 
bringing in its wake a burgeoning epidemic of glyphosate-resistant “super 
weeds.”73  The fallout of this invention has been well-documented through multiple 
instances of economic harm,74 fundamental reshaping of choice75 and lifestyle 
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 67. See Charles W. Schmitt, Genetically Modified Foods:  Breeding Uncertainty, ENVTL. HEALTH 
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 68. See Homer, supra note 17. 
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 70. See JAMES MATSON, MINLI TANG, & SARAH WYNN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND MARKET 
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 73. See Stephen B. Powles, Gene Amplification Delivers Glyphosate-Resistant Weed Evolution, 107 
PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 955, 955 (2010).   
 74. See supra Section III. 
 75. See Ghoshray, supra note 72. 
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changes for farmers76 and consumers,77 irreversible loss of biodiversity,78 pervasive 
contamination within the environment,79 and irreparable harm to ecology through 
pollution.80  
Pollution by transgenic crops is fundamentally different and structurally more 
dangerous than traditional chemical pollution.81  With traditional chemical 
pollution, no gene transfer or fundamental alteration of biologic material takes 
place.82  In contrast, some genetically engineered crops propagate pollution via 
transgenic pathways by triggering widespread contamination as they alter and 
enhance gene flow from genetically engineered crops to target organic entities and 
species.83  Transgenic contamination includes enhanced crop injury, herbicide drift, 
and proliferation of intractable super weeds.  The economic fallout of such 
contamination comes in the form of cost enhancement to both growers and 
consumers.84  Economics aside, there remain other adverse implications.  Although 
fundamental in nature, these negative effects have been neither discussed nor 
considered in any analysis associated with granting Monsanto-type biotechnology 
companies exclusive rights to shape U.S. farming practices through the patent 
framework. 
Considering the various fallouts from corporate manipulation of the U.S. 
patent framework, the paradox of food security becomes even more acute.  If there 
does exist a basic consumer right to food safety and a basic right to retain an 
agricultural way of life, it is severely threatened by market concentration and 
consolidation,85 as well as by market manipulation by corporate domination and 
monopolization.86  The time is therefore ripe for a renewed introspection into the 
interaction between genetic engineering and patent protection.  
To better understand the legal framework that is currently being used by 
corporate giants to prosecute farmers while stripping consumers of their right to 
food choice, I next explore a prototypical patent prosecution case pending before 
the U.S. Supreme Court, the outcome of which might reverberate for decades to 
come.  
V.  BOWMAN V. MONSANTO:  A PEEK INTO THE FUTURE 
In this Section, I retrace the steps taken by the biotechnology giant Monsanto 
in using existing provisions within the U.S. patent framework to consolidate its 
position as a dominant crop seed marketer.  Left behind Monsanto’s blazing trail of 
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 78. See Schmitt, supra note 67. 
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corporate glory are stories of broken lives and shattered dreams of ordinary 
humans.  While current legal frameworks emphasize intellectual property rights 
within the food system, not much energy is devoted to identifying therein 
fundamental human rights for consumers and non-corporate citizens.  This 
produces palpable imperfections and inherent difficulties for the legal system.  Let 
us take the case of the pending U.S. Supreme Court litigation in Bowman v, 
Monsanto.87 Despite being billed in some parlance as a plain vanilla patent 
infringement case, Bowman is more than that.  Bowman typifies the complexities of 
lives made difficult by a concoction of aggressive patent prosecutions and 
inadequate regulatory oversight.  Moreover, the outcome of Bowman will have far-
reaching ramifications for not only the future of U.S. farming, but also the future of 
consumer rights and food security in the U.S., for which the analysis below will 
proceed in two parts. 
A.  Prologue:  Background, Issues, and Implications  
of Bowman v. Monsanto  
The legal dispute in Bowman arrives in part from Monsanto seeking exemption 
from the long-standing U.S. patent doctrine of “patent exhaustion.”88  The basic 
premise of law here is that the holder of a patent relinquishes its right to a patent as 
it relates to the patent holder’s bilateral relationship with the buyer. The doctrine 
thus prevents the patent holder from holding the buyer liable from engaging in acts 
related to the normal use of the patented product.89  Monsanto however, has 
insisted on using a complex doctrinal loophole—the conditional sale exemption.90  
Conditional sale allows the seller of a patented product certain residual rights, even 
after the sale has been consummated, by proceeding along one or both of the 
following pathways:91 
1. Using a contractual arrangement, the seller of the patented product can 
incorporate a conditional sale provision which can legally bind the buyer 
into periodic purchase for a designated duration, or, in theory, even until 
perpetuity.  This enables the seller a guaranteed, steady stream of revenue 
until the conditioned time.  
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2. The buyer of the patented product is prevented from exercising his or her 
normal use of the product, on the basis of the stated conditional 
provision(s) within the contractual agreement. 
The difficulty with the conditional sales exception comes from its inherent 
contradiction with the fundamental premise of the broader patent paradigm.  In 
general, patent law’s objective is to avoid absurd results during the course of patent 
infringement prosecution, or for that matter, during the stipulated life of patent 
practice.  Implicit in the Bowman scenario, then, is Monsanto’s quest for an 
assurance that would seem to go against this basic principle, as it attempts to apply 
the conditional sale exception to the future sale of its patented seed technology in 
perpetuity.92  Additionally, Monsanto’s argument reveals a carefully crafted 
strategy of corporate risk management as the company seeks an “end of the run” 
extension of its contractual arrangement even if the conditional sale exception is 
exhausted.93  There is a fundamental divergence between Monsanto’s patent 
argument and traditional patent doctrine, which warrants further exploration.  
Historically, the landscape of intellectual property law for agricultural seeds 
has been animated by the patent exhaustion upon sale doctrine.  In principle, any 
authorized sale should trigger exhaustion of patent rights such that the holder of the 
patent no longer controls the broader seed market.  According to the facts of the 
case, Bowman purchased GE soybeans on the commodities market—not directly 
from Monsanto, but from a third party vendor—and used the seeds to grow a 
second generation of crop instead of using them as feed or for biodiesel.94  These 
seeds were grown and sold by the third party pursuant to a contract with 
Monsanto.95  Under the traditional patent exhaustion principle, upon the 
consummation of the sale from the third party to Bowman, the patent holder 
Monsanto would not be conferred any residual control over the use of those seeds, 
including their subsequent distribution. Monsanto, however, claims that the 
conditional sale provision in the third party vendor’s contract prohibited Bowman 
from growing a second generation of crop. 
Whether or not the outcome of this case should be controlled by the 
conditional sale loophole within the patent exhaustion doctrine is debatable.  
Likewise, whether the “normal use” of seeds should exclude their planting to grow 
a new generation of crop is also subject to a future definitive ruling by the Court.  
Taking a broader view of the word “use,” the concept of normal use could certainly 
be expanded to not restrict the use of such seeds for farming, as long as farming 
know-how can be shown to be embedded in the traditional farming knowledge.  
Thus, the U.S. patent framework is faced with a two-fold difficulty: (1) to identify 
what constitutes traditional knowledge in this scenario, and (2) to determine the 
scope of traditional agricultural knowledge, and how this knowledge might impact 
the limits of normal use for the purpose of delineating exhaustion upon sale from 
the conditional sale exception.    
The complexity of the Bowman case comes from the nature of the crops in 
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question.  The crops self-replicate in such a way that the second and any 
subsequent generations are genetically identical to the first generation and, 
therefore, might legitimately come within the scope of Monsanto’s patent.  As 
Monsanto’s patent infringement suit proceeded through the district court and the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the courts’ in both instances held that that 
the patent exhaustion doctrine is not applicable to new copies of the patented 
product.96   
If we were to analogize the scenario with an example from the publishing 
world, the situation is somewhat akin to copyright issues. For example, applying 
the exhaustion upon sale doctrine, the purchaser of a copyrighted book could resell 
or distribute the book without infringing on the publisher’s copyright.  But there 
exists a major limitation to this exhaustion doctrine.  Protection is granted against 
use of legitimate copy in making subsequent unauthorized copies for profit.  Thus, 
in the farming scenario, growing a second generation of crops from a patented first 
generation product can be compared with making photocopies of a copyrighted 
book.  
The difficulty in analogizing, however, comes from the fact that photocopying 
a book is fundamentally different than copying a seed. Books are inanimate objects 
that cannot self-replicate, whereas second-generation crops may indeed be a 
product of “sprouting” or self-replication which might very well be considered a 
traditional farming practice. The question the Supreme Court should consider, then, 
is whether it is a legitimate farming practice to grow a second generation crop 
based on patented product of the first generation, and whether this can be 
considered a normal usage of a product covered under patent exhaustion upon sale.  
This invites various interesting questions:  Does the patented exhaustion doctrine 
immunize the farmer from legal liability for growing a second and subsequent 
generations?  Or, does the patent holder still retain residual rights to any subsequent 
generation?  Does the self-replicating nature of such seeds confer legitimacy to the 
farmer’s action by embedding within normal usage nature’s functionality of self-
replication?  
In sum, Bowman v. Monsanto brings to the surface two very important issues 
regarding the patent framework:  First, the question of whether or not a patent right 
is exhausted at the point of sale in these biotechnology seeds cases. Second, 
interrelated with the outcome of this first issue, how the exhaustion doctrine applies 
to subsequent generations of seeds.  Both answers will determine the future of food 
safety in the U.S. in a significant way.   
Relevant to this discussion is the Supreme Court’s 2008 ruling in Quanta 
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,97 where the Court noted that “[t]he long 
standing doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a 
patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.”98  This would imply that the 
condition of use might not affect, implicate, or bind the subsequent purchase sale 
framework unless the buyers and sellers agree to be bound by a contract during the 
initial authorized sale.  This is a rather plain vanilla framework of ordinary property 
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rights law that requires further interpretive gloss.  
Here, personal property rights and intellectual property rights do not come in 
conflict.  The issue becomes complicated, not on the exhaustion principle, but 
rather on the scope of the subsequent use scenarios.  Whether exhaustion gives the 
purchaser the right to use original source materials for generating replicas, or 
whether the self-replicating functionality immunizes such copy is still subject to the 
Court’s definitive ruling.  Whether patent rights in seeds grown by lawful planting 
is exhausted at the point of authorized sale and thus the self-replicating nature of 
the invention automatically immunizes subsequent generation as they are already 
embodied in prior generation, is the key point of contention in the outcome of this 
patent infringement issue. Clearly, residing at the core of this patent infringement 
question is the prudent understanding of self-replication, especially in exploring 
whether self-replication is a legitimate use of the product.  The question is what 
will influence this determination?  Will it be the traditional farming knowledge of 
self-replication of a living organism as part of its natural life cycle, or the linguistic 
meaning of usage based on how close the various functionalities are from the 
original usage?  No doubt, one of the meanings will certainly shape the final 
outcome on this very important question of law.  
With the complexities arising from the science of self-replication, the 
lexicographic interpretation of normal usage, and the conundrum generated by 
these dichotomous concepts animating the longstanding patent exhaustion doctrine, 
it is clear that the intellectual property framework for biotechnological seeds lacks 
the interpretive acumen to respond to the innovative twists of technological 
sophistication. Consequently, selected biotechnology corporations have faced 
unprecedented consolidation.99  This has resulted in a significant decrease in seed 
inventory, which has, in turn, suffocated and stifled scientific research,100 reduced 
farmers’ independence,101 and taken away consumers’ choice.102  
We are thus confronted with the telling question: although patent exhaustion 
has been the mainstay of American patent law for over 150 years,103 why isn’t it 
applicable to Monsanto and other major biotechnology agriculture giants?  The real 
answer lies in the twisted saga of intertwined policy and politics (an area that is 
beyond the scope of this essay).  Focusing on the legal issue at hand, if the 
Supreme Court does not retrench the contours of corporate domination, the 
problems of aggressive prosecution of farmers and gradual weakening of consumer 
                                                                                                     
 99. See John Hession, Biotech Consolidation:  Is There Light in the Tunnel?, MASS HIGH TECH 
(June 25, 2009), http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/mass-high-tech/2009/06/biotech-
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 100. See Andrew Pollack, Crop Scientists Say Biotechnology Seed Companies Are Thwarting 
Research, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/20/business/20crop.html?_r=0. 
 101. See CHARLES BENBROOK, THE ORGANIC CENTER, THE MAGNITUDE AND IMPACTS OF THE 
BIOTECH AND ORGANIC SEED PRICE PREMIUM 1-3, 6-9 (2009), available at https://www.organic-
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 102. See Ghoshray, supra note 72. 
 103. The doctrine of patent exhaustion, indicating an initial authorized sale of a patented item 
exhausts all patent rights to further uses or sales of that item has been one of the mainstays of American 
patent law.  Today called the First Sale Doctrine, it originated in Supreme Court’s opinion in the 1853 
case of Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539 (1853). 
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rights will continue to escalate.   
As noted elsewhere,104 most of the farmer prosecutions have been associated 
with instances of falsehood and impersonation.  This has, indeed, changed the 
farmers’ way of life by imposing hurdles along the trajectory of traditional farming 
practices.105  For example, a single use restriction via creative patent enforcement 
through entrapment and confrontation, threat of lawsuits with grievous 
consequences for saving seeds from prior years, or even chance occurrences in 
nature via cross pollination or transgenic contamination has increased costs to U.S. 
farmers and has resulted in economic adversity and restriction of choices to U.S. 
consumers. Moreover, consumer safety research by independent scientists not 
affiliated with corporate entities has been stymied due to the unavailability of seeds 
for analysis.106  As a result, patent prosecutions to control markets and raise seed 
prices have unequivocally taken power away from producers and consumers and 
put it into the hands of a restricted few marketers and seed producers.   
While this essay calls for charting a new patent framework, whether via 
legislative enactment or through a prudent ruling by the Supreme Court, the policy 
implications of successive administrations must also be examined.  Here, the 
poignant question is how these administrations have allowed consolidated 
monopolization to continue unchecked.   Looking at the comparable landscape of 
Monsanto’s monopoly power in other countries, it is apparent that public interests 
animate the legal situation in other countries.  Although Monsanto enjoys 
immunity in the U.S. on various fronts as I have highlighted earlier, the reality is 
fundamentally different in other countries, especially in Argentina,107 Brazil,108 and 
the U.K.,109 as I have shown elsewhere.110  When it comes to the U.S. intellectually 
property framework, the time has come to end special exceptions to corporations.  
Even if the Court agrees with the traditional exhaustion upon sale doctrine, it 
must also address Monsanto’s position seeking an end-run around exhaustion.  If 
the Court agrees that the traditional exhaustion upon sale doctrine applies to both 
the first generation of seeds and its subsequent progenies, the petitioner Bowman 
would prevail.  Recognizing this, the respondent Monsanto included in its filing a 
pleading for the Court to create for them a new end-run around exhaustion.  This 
new end-run will expand the reach of traditional exhaustion doctrine by allowing 
                                                                                                     
 104. See Amicus Brief, supra note 61, at 12 (“Respondents devote a staff of 75 with an annual 
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patent holder to avoid patent exhaustion upon sale.  However, such an end-run 
around exhaustion might be difficult to achieve, as the reasoning seems to be in 
contradiction with both reconfiguring and infringing to 35 U.S.C.A. § 154.111  It 
would also be contrary to the Quanta opinion by the Supreme Court.112  However, 
taking an expanded interpretation of the Quanta holding, a contrarian argument 
could also be asserted.  Noting that while Quanta is generally recognized a method 
case,113 the Bowman scenario may be interpreted to fall outside the ambit of a 
method case by arguing that  it is an apparatus case.   In other words, by 
characterizing Monsanto’s invention as not falling strictly within the confines of a 
method patent, argument can be advanced for it being closer to an apparatus patent.  
This, undoubtedly, would leave the Supreme Court to chart new territory towards 
developing a more deterministic patent paradigm.  
Furthermore, as to the prior discussion on normal usage, the controversy over 
usage versus generation is a difficult one to reconcile.  To resolve the quandary of 
whether farming with seed is an example of usage or making would invariably 
depend on interpretation of language.  This would lead to yet another paradox of 
determining whether developing a second generation seed is “making new” or 
“using to do something.”  In my view, the answer should resort to basics by 
determining when patent exhaustion occurred and by utilizing the conventional 
meaning of ordinary pursuit, following the paradigm presented in Stenberg v. 
Carhart.114  Relying on more than 10,000 years of history of human civilization, 
what has been traditionally recognized and understood by mankind as ordinary 
pursuit should be the controlling authority in determining what constitutes normal 
usage for the purpose of determining- what activities by the buyer are permitted 
under sale of a patented product. Implicit in this interpretation is the recognition 
that patent exhaustion occurs when a purchaser buys a patented item for the 
purpose of using it in the ordinary pursuit of life. Is making second-generation seed 
in a self-replicating crop an ordinary pursuit of life, or is it generating newness that 
is embedded in the original authorized purchase? This is the key question.  
On the other hand, not rejecting Monsanto’s plea to grant an exception to the 
conditional sale would be tantamount to conferring upon the dominant corporation 
an unprecedented market power.  The question could also turn on answering 
whether seed planting by Bowman is an inherent property right.  These are 
complicated questions and require not only using prudent judgment based on 
tradition and an understanding of historical practices, but also looking beyond 
tradition and contemplating an uncertain future.  This contemplation of the future 
should strike a balance between corporate right to profit and the consumer’s right 
to food safety and security.  
How the Supreme Court decides Bowman v. Monsanto could produce 
devastating consequences for farmers with respect to any future individual attempts 
                                                                                                     
 111. 35 U.S.C.A. § 154 (Westlaw current through P.L. 112-207). 
 112. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., 553 U.S. 617 (2008). 
 113. According to Quanta, the sale of an incomplete (but licensed) product that does not include all 
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to save seeds purchased from patent owners such as Monsanto. In the event that the 
doctrine of patent exhaustion is extended to go beyond its traditional confines, or if 
Monsanto’s end use exception is granted, the impact will include more than mere 
consolidation:  excessive corporate concentration could give rise to monopoly-
based predatory power held by patent owners. This would both reduce the 
consumer options and increase costs to various stakeholders.  Moreover, these 
impacts are inconsistent with the basic premise of contract law, which prohibits 
predatory, unconscionable contracts or contracts entered into without good faith. 
B.  Bowman v. Monsanto:  Argument and a Cautionary Tale 
The Bowman case went before the Supreme Court on February 19, 2013.115 
The decision is not expected by the time this essay sees the light of day. Therefore, 
this segment of my analysis will refrain from dissecting the merits of the case in 
absolute terms.  Yet I must provide a cautionary tale—a stark reminder of what is 
at stake.  If the Court sees the central questions in Quanta and Bowman to evolve in 
different trajectories, it might call for self-replicating biological products in 
Bowman to be treated differently than products in question in Quanta.  This might 
shield from patent exhaustion the first sale of self-replicating products.  Such a 
result would imply that, as a biological product moves from one generation to the 
next, a new set of patent rights is conferred upon the patent holder.  This process 
might continue in perpetuity, thereby permanently foreclosing the patentee’s right 
to the use of seed for planting through the threat of patent infringement.  Although 
this result would impart clarity in dealing with the patentability of self-replicating 
biological products, it would also be a historic departure from the Court’s current 
trajectory of strengthening the patent exhaustion doctrine.  Given the Chief 
Justice’s questioning during the oral argument,116 which predominantly centered on 
structuring the patentability argument on corporate monopoly rent-seeking 
behavior,117 this could be a likely outcome. 
Historically, the Supreme Court has provided much-needed restraint on the 
                                                                                                     
 115. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S.Ct. 420 (U.S. 2012) (No. 
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Federal Circuit’s expansionist paradigm, preventing the steady erosion of the patent 
exhaustion doctrine.  This was succinctly made clear in Quanta, where the Court 
proscribed that patent rights should not control the post-sale use or disposition of a 
product “that substantially embodies a patent.”118  If the central question in 
Bowman is to be evaluated through this prism of Quanta, the Court might very well 
isolate the operational elements of the Quanta analysis to provide clarification on 
the scope and context of “use” and the definition of the “product in question.” 
Since Quanta had not conclusively foreclosed the issue of self-replication with the 
language “that substantially embodies a patent,”119 the Bowman Court may be 
reluctant to construe such language to describe a self-replicating product.  This is 
especially true because the inherent paradox in structuring patent rights for self-
replicating products—such as the RR soybean seeds—leaves uncertain the 
temporal aspect of patent exhaustion.  The following two-pronged inquiry 
illustrates this paradox. 
First, Quanta and Bowman present two different factual scenarios in the 
application of the first sale exhaustion doctrine to subsequent generations of the 
products.  This distinction relates to the physical and temporal characteristics of the 
products in the two cases. The exhaustion issue in Quanta dealt with non-
biological, inanimate component parts purchased from licensed sources and 
subsequently assembled to form working products—recognized as a traditional use 
in the electronics, telecommunications, automotive and aerospace industries.120  
Bowman, by contrast, deals with self-replicating biological products.  Each 
successive generation of physical objects (here, seeds) preserves substantial 
similarity in both its physical and functional characteristics, such that products in 
subsequent generations may be seen to “embody” the patent itself just as did the 
first generation.  This characteristic might be a pathway through which the 
Bowman Court could preserve the status quo in its formulation of patent exhaustion 
doctrine but still hold in favor of Monsanto.121  
Second, within the current contours of patent exhaustion doctrine, self-
replicating products present another unique quandary.  Currently it is unclear 
whether the traditional farming practice of using seeds for planting is a prohibited 
act under patent infringement—akin to copying a CD or a book.  By deciding 
whether farming by harvesting and re-planting seeds is fundamentally 
distinguishable from “copying” non-biologic, tangible goods like a CD or a book, 
the Bowman Court may be called upon to rename a traditional human act, 
historically shaped by natural processes.  The Court may be forced to re-
characterize farming in this way because biotechnological innovation has 
fundamentally altered the context and confines of the act.  Going along this 
trajectory by the Court will have significant impacts along multiple dimensions in 
the U.S. food chain, a few of which I shall elaborate below. 
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 First, in response to Bowman’s central question, invalidating the patent 
exhaustion doctrine’s applicability to subsequent generation of the seeds in 
question will undoubtedly weaken the patent exhaustion doctrine. This doctrine has 
already been eroded through a steady stream of decisions of the Federal Circuit, not 
all of which find their way into the Supreme Court.  Furthermore, if the Court holds 
that farmers’ use of seeds for their foreseeable and natural purposes is illegitimate, 
it will profoundly impact farmers’ traditional way of life—following to its chilling 
conclusion a trend that began with introduction of biotechnological seeds into U.S. 
farming practices three decades ago.  Any farmer who buys GE seeds will have to 
re-purchase new seeds for each growing season rather than harvesting and re-
planting seeds from the previous generation of crop.  The alternative—to eschew 
GE seeds—is almost certainly illusory.  Few farmers will be able to compete in the 
mass marketplace without using the hardier, pesticide-resistant GE products.  Thus, 
except for farmers catering to the currently-miniscule market for non-GE foods, all 
U.S. farmers will be forced into Monsanto’s preferred paradigm of purchasing new 
seeds for every generation.  This imposed alteration in traditional farming will 
significantly impact both domestic food security and, more broadly, consumer’s 
food rights, as companies like Monsanto establish a stranglehold on domestic food 
production. 
Second, by conferring the continued right of patent protection on subsequent 
generations of seeds, the Bowman Court might awaken us to a more fundamental 
quandary in the essential limits of patent rights.  As I have shown elsewhere 
exploring the current patent framework’s gradual expansion of scope in the context 
of biological products,122 I am once again distressed by the failure of courts and 
policy makers to contextualize the patentability of biological products within the 
deeper fundamentals of mankind’s common heritage.  Who can legally control a 
product of life?123  At the core, Monsanto’s seed—“roundup ready” or otherwise—
is a product of life.  Monsanto simply alters it, partially, by replacing one 
component with a more desirable component.  Therefore, the two fundamental 
questions in Bowman—whether patent exhaustion ends at subsequent generations, 
and whether such exhaustion becomes categorically inapplicable for self-
replicating products—leads us to the corollary question:  Who can control a 
product of life?  We must recognize that, fundamentally, a biotechnology 
corporation cannot yet create a seed—a product of nature—ex nihilo.  The patent 
right that is conferred upon Monsanto is to a specific sequence DNA; this is a 
component part of the seed and is not the seed itself.  Therefore, conferral upon a 
corporation by judicial pronouncement of this right to control a product of life will 
fundamentally alter the ownership of a public resource that must be recognized as 
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belonging to the public domain.124  This resource is vital to food safety and human 
survival.  Residing within the characteristics of self-replication is a distinctive 
feature that makes it a product of life—a uniqueness that must make the “product” 
distinguishable from products on which corporations can assert right of exclusivity 
via patent practice and prosecution.125 
We will miss a fundamental point of asymmetry if we focus only on the 
doctrinal implication of Vernon Bowman’s fight against Monsanto.  Corroborated 
by Mr. Bowman during an interview with the author, his procurement of mixed 
seeds from the elevator was designed as a risk management practice.126  When 
planting a second generation of seeds, a farmer has a much lower chance of 
growing the crop.127  If the farmer purchases higher cost seed and fails to produce 
his desired crop, he loses his investment.  Therefore, a typical farmer of mixed 
crops engages in a natural risk management mechanism by purchasing the licensed 
product from biotechnological seed companies for his first planting, while relying 
on a secondary source of mixed seeds (here a grain elevator) for his second 
planting.128  The mixed seeds used for the second planting may contain some 
patented seeds and some non-patented seeds.129  Generally, not all RR seeds within 
the mixed variety see the light of day.  Only those seeds that germinate into crops 
might come under the purview of patent infringement. 
What makes this situation asymmetric is that if the second planting in question 
did not grow crop that included Monsanto’s patented DNA, Monsanto would 
almost certainly not have brought the suit for patent infringement.  At a functional 
level, the patent infringement lawsuit in question is partially based on a 
probabilistic occurrence.  Thus, a Supreme Court ruling favorable to Monsanto 
would deny to any farmer the opportunity to meaningfully manage the economic 
risk of his or her second crop for fear of accidentally acquiring and growing some 
patented seeds.  Monsanto, meanwhile, would continue to realize, without any risk, 
the benefits of its seed patents.  But the implications are not limited only to farmers 
who are actively trying to manage risk.  Any farmer who even unintentionally grew 
second-generation patented seeds could come within the expanded scope of patent 
infringement.  This would lead to a truly untenable outcome—an eventuality that 
did not escape the thoughtful scrutiny of Justice Elena Kagan during the oral 
argument.130  Thus, the asymmetry of the framework reveals itself in this 
dichotomy: a corporation could protect itself by invocation of an expanded, 
maximalist131 conception of patentability, but a farmer could be denied the ability 
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to engage in basic risk management. 
It is my hope that in deciding whether to confer upon Monsanto the right to 
own generations of patented seeds in perpetuity, the venerable Court recognizes 
patent law’s utility and novelty considerations in the self-replication context.  
Fundamentally, the Court might be prudent in carefully analyzing whether a change 
in a component within the seed is “markedly different”132 and significantly novel, 
as such component level analysis might have a significant bearing on how far the 
Court expands the patent scope from the first generation to the next generation.133 
VI.  LINKAGES BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  
AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS 
Thus far, I have addressed two legal paradigms, each of which individually 
and collectively has shaped food safety and security in the U.S.  Traditional legal 
analysis in this arena has typically addressed one of these two legal paradigms, to 
the exclusion of the other.  Deviating from this methodology of focusing on one of 
the paradigms at a time, this section examines why the linkages between the two 
frameworks are significant. 
This essay searches for answers to the vexing problem of food security and 
proposes that efforts to resolve the problem of food security lies in the 
consideration of  rights of consumers, farmers, and non-corporate citizens within 
both paradigms of biotechnology regulation and intellectual property law.  The 
fundamental problem with this approach, however, is that these rights are in 
contradiction with the established rights of entities like larger seed producers and 
multinational biotechnology companies.   
Both intellectual property law and biotechnology regulation are bound by 
political processes and cultural frameworks that have allowed the erosion of 
fundamental rights of consumers.  Understanding the linkages between the two 
legal frameworks starts with recognizing their shared historical strands within the 
U.S. property rights paradigm.  Their shared strands also reflect the stark 
commonality of the legal system’s failure, seen through the myriad lower court 
cases involving patent infringement by farmers, in which the corporate patent rights 
have predominantly prevailed over consumer rights or traditional farming rights. In 
a majority of these cases, the courts, regardless of how unjust and unnatural 
foreclosing traditional farmers’ way of life may be, side with the corporation.  
Because the current legal process remains constricted within a narrow formalism, it 
fails to capture corporate consolidation’s impact on the broader sociological 
framework.  As a result, the legacy of these judicial opinions continues to foster an 
atmosphere of abandonment of traditional ways of life and widespread consumer 
frustration.  
This begs the question:  must we instead view food security in the U.S. within 
a fundamental rights narrative?  What theoretical framework do we have from 
which to understand food security from a rights narrative?  We are prompted into 
this inquiry because contemporary food safety and security conversations tend to 
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originate from either an intellectual property law discussion or a regulatory 
framework based narrative. Yet, within any narrative of rights, invocation of rights 
is fluid. Sometimes legal rights are subsumed under broader fundamental rights.  
Failure to do so has been the fatal flaw of U.S. food rights narrative.  Instead, the 
narrative has been caught within the inconsistencies of diverging strands of rights.  
Granulating these commingled rights under distinct threads of legal, human, and 
fundamental doctrines will help in understanding the legal narrative.  It is critical in 
the unfolding story of America’s food safety that the rights paradigm is considered.  
The first step in doing so is to understand the linkages between the intellectual 
property paradigm and the regulatory framework.  The second step is to place the 
rights of consumers and farmers within a broader spectrum of fundamental rights. 
Biotechnology regulation and intellectual property law create certain 
symmetry within the main legal framework—one without the other simply cannot 
sustain by itself.  To address the impacts of inadequate biotechnology regulation, 
one must understand what would happen if the patent framework were left with its 
loopholes.  Thus, even if we were to tighten biotechnology regulation, the 
difficulties that consumers and farmers face would continue due to loopholes 
within the patent framework.  Likewise, even if a robust patent framework were 
envisioned, the lack of corresponding regulatory enhancement would continue to 
empower corporations over consumers and farmers.  Without making the necessary 
fixes to the regulatory framework, even the most diligent patent review would fail 
to solve the problem of food security.  Therefore, both the regulation of 
biotechnology must be tightened and the patent framework must be made robust. 
 Awareness for food safety in the U.S. must recognize the grave danger of 
food shortage that lurks beneath the underbelly of a maximalist patent paradigm for 
biologic products. Thus, if we allow the patent framework to continue its 
expansionist agenda, the food security in the U.S. might soon find itself hostage to 
private rights. This is because, manifested in the concentration of the biotechnology 
seed industry is the shaping effect of an unbridled intellectual property (IP) rights 
paradigm that some experts view as “biogopolies.”134 As the regulatory mechanism 
facilitates such market concentration, by conferring monopoly rights through 
statutory construction, the linkages between a fragmented regulatory framework 
and an expansionist IP right paradigm become clearer. Although the conferral of 
statutory monopoly is recognized as an incentive for pursuing creativity in 
exchange for commercial exploitation, in practical terms, the exclusivity under the 
IP monopoly has been further accentuated in the absence of a significant regulatory 
oversight in biotechnology innovations. These combined into a de facto mechanism 
that gave rise to a slew of unethical business practices, including expulsion of 
competitors and consolidation of market power, among others. This distorted 
mechanism resulted in a twin-tragedy – the farmers subjugated into exclusive 
contracts for periodic purchase from seed corporations and the consumers induced 
into a Hobson’s choice of GE food. The emerging threat to the traditional 
agricultural landscape in the U.S. must be seen through this prism of reality. 
Tracing the roadmap towards a future of food safety and security in the U.S. 
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will require conceptualizing the source of danger. It comes from the linkages 
between propertization of genetic resources and the biogopoly of proprietary 
biotechnology. This biogopoly emerged through the combination of patent law and 
regulatory framework and as such, the linkage has fundamentally altered the 
original objective of biotechnology – that of achieving food security by enhancing 
our knowledge to an ultra-restrictive covenant - that of resource concentration via 
private appropriation of knowledge.135 By allowing an over-broad patent claim in 
most biotechnology products, contemporary patent framework has allowed 
corporations to usurp asymmetric property rights relative to other stakeholders.136 
As the Courts have become the arbiters of patentability, they have continued to 
lower the patentability threshold for biologic products and living organisms. This 
has undoubtedly, enabled corporations to secure patents through an expanded 
conception of “markedly different characteristics.”137 When applied to area of 
biotechnology seeds, this can only spell disaster for food security, unless the course 
is reversed by raising the current threshold for patent protection.138  While the final 
chapter in the saga of Bowman v. Monsanto is yet to be written, the impending 
decision of the Court must recognize that in its hand lies the recipe to avert a 
biotechnological anti-commons tragedy.139  
In an attempt to clarify the relationship between regulatory framework and 
food safety, I must address the issue of optimal level of federal regulation. Since 
this area is fraught with many internal inconsistencies, it may have stymied various 
regulatory efforts in streamlining product assimilation and adoption into the food 
chain. Often times, a particular innovation either gets fast-tracked into normal use 
or gets stymied by regulatory hurdles on account of public participation. Therefore, 
how much public participation must be allowed within the context of federal 
rulemaking has become one of the thorniest issues in contemporary 
biotechnological innovation. Moreover, the issue of federalism may have a shaping 
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 137. See Ghoshray, supra note 119, at 536-39 (discussing a U.S. District Court’s “clear shift to keep 
products of nature outside the scope of patentability”). 
 138. See Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food (Jean 
Ziegler), A/HRC/7/5 ¶ 44 (Jan. 10, 2008), available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/7session/reports.htm (click “E” link for “Report of the 
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 139. The concept of biotechnology’s “anti-commons tragedy” echoes the biomedical anti-commons 
tragedy. Cf. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S.  
Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 
(May 1, 1998). 
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affect, which is manifested mostly in giving rise to a delay in granting approval for 
new products. This brings us to an apparent paradox in biotechnology regulation – 
finding the right balance between a bottom-up versus a top-down mechanism. 
One of the fallouts of the current fragmented approach in biotechnology 
regulation is the often unnecessary delay associated with the approval process for 
some products.  This elevates the issue of how best to structure an optimum level of 
public participation in the process, setting up a quintessential point of divergence in 
law between the public’s right to know versus the public’s need to know.  For 
example, often times, especially during the initial adoption of newer GE products, 
an overabundance of public outcry might result in excessively unwanted public 
participation in the rulemaking process, leading to a perceived information 
distortion within the regulatory approval process.140  However, viewing this 
through the prism of information distortion only tells part of the story.  The issue 
must be viewed in its comprehensiveness, through the balancing struggle between 
information distortion and information asymmetry.  For example, when a 
biotechnology company attempts to saturate the consumer market with distorted 
advertisement, drowning along the way advocacy efforts of interest groups, 
consumer voices must be allowed at least to an optimum extent, to match the 
corporate efforts.  Not doing so will set up for the general consumer a choice 
between believing a false rationality or a distorted reality.  Thus, by allowing 
public participation in the process, regulatory framework can retain both the 
sanctity and robustness of the approval process.  In this context, how much public 
participation is to be allowed must be determined through a composite function that 
balances the information asymmetry introduced by corporate advertisement and 
information distortion attempted by excessive public participation. 
The fragmented nature of regulatory affairs and their imprecise and 
inconsistent implementation of the approval process creates regulatory impasse 
within the approval process. The uncertainty introduced by such impasse could 
evolve in two ways. First, in the absence of a robust trajectory of federal law in a 
particular area, the states may engage in micro level rule making, which has the 
potential to unravel by different states developing disproportionate and disjointed 
regulatory frameworks. This might gravitate in conflict of laws for interstate 
commerce, calling for the development of a top down approach. Contrarily, 
however, having a centralized authority within a federal framework supervising a 
diverging array of intersecting rights and interests may suffer from an inherent 
drawback.  When the confines of law cannot adequately encapsulate local nuances 
and micro-level specificities that may arise out of the interplay between technology 
and culture, indeterminacy and incompatibility in implementation may result.  This 
incompatibility and inconsistency calls for developing a bottom-up approach that 
may suffer from an implementation quagmire in creating indeterminacy in law and 
making implementation difficult.  This sets up a classic conflict in law between the 
top-down approach and the bottom-up approach.141  
                                                                                                     
 140. See, e.g., Lars Noah, Whatever Happened to the “Frankenfish”? The FDA’s Foot Dragging on 
the Transgenic Salmon, 65 ME. L. REV. 605 (2013).  
 141. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI. L. 
REV. (2006); Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05-025, available at  
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Therefore regulatory agencies responsible for food safety in the U.S. must craft 
a carefully balanced approach by recognizing the inherent limits of federal 
encapsulation of all possible scenarios within individual localities.  The federal 
approach should proceed on a broader contour that would allow agencies to 
incorporate a set of touch points with the various sensitive areas where food safety 
might be at risk, while also recognizing local nuances and cultural sensitivities.  
Let us eat and drink; for tomorrow we shall die. – Isaiah 22:13142 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Beneath the glossy veneer of America’s food system, there is a silent yet stark 
reality.  This reality manifests itself in many ways:  through the documented stories 
of farmers’ plights under biotechnology corporation’s seed restrictions, in 
consumers’ inability to identify their genetically modified staples, through 
transgenic pollution and proliferation of superweeds.  Prompted by this realization, 
this essay embarked on exploring some poignant questions:  Is American food 
security at peril?  Has America’s legendary food safety been hijacked by unbridled 
corporatization?  Tracing two distinct legal pathways—the regulatory landscape 
and the intellectual property paradigm—this essay addresses food security and 
safety along the same thematic lines.  
Commenting on the linkages between threats to the food system and the legal 
paradigms overseeing the system, I contend that, although the concepts are 
fundamentally distinct, they are also complementary, conveying similar concerns 
within a broader spectrum.  They are also linked in terms of their corresponding 
supervisory legal frameworks, which leads to two observations.  First, threats to 
food security arise from questionable patent prosecutions of farmers, which are 
facilitating a broader agenda of corporate hijacking of the intellectual property 
framework. Second, threats to food safety in the U.S. have been accentuated by 
lackluster implementation of biotechnology regulations, wherein regulatory 
authority is derived from arcane statutes and through a fragmented patchwork of 
federal agencies.  
A future safe and secure food supply in the U.S. must be illuminated by two 
observations from the present. First, the current regulatory framework inadequately 
deals with the uncertain and complex nuances of biotechnology applications for 
food crops. Second, loopholes within the current intellectual property framework 
have allowed leading agriculture biotechnology companies to reshape centuries-old 
farming practices in the U.S.  As an example, by using its leadership position in 
agricultural biotechnology, Monsanto has been able to both monopolize the market 
and force both farmers and consumers into making less than optimal choices.  
Finally, this essay calls for a reexamination of the traditional discourse on food 
safety and security in the West.  By shifting the conversation into a rights-based 
narrative, we must first identify the rights that must be part of the conversation. 
Second, we must place these rights within their identifiable loci.  After all, without 
identifying appropriate rights and how they must evolve, we cannot develop a 
                                                                                                     
http://ssrn.com/abstract=807685 (discussing the context and scope of the two general methods by means 
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 142. Isaiah 22:13 (New King James). 
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proper construction of such rights.  It is high time to recognize the rights of 
farmers, consumers, and non-corporate citizens within the broader spectrum of 
fundamental rights.  Only then will the inertia within both the regulatory and 
intellectual property paradigms be disturbed, and only then humans will be 
empowered to change course from an unbridled pursuit of eat, drink and be merry 
to a tempered pursuit that fosters life, celebration, and more importantly, food and 
water prosperity for all mankind. 
 
APPENDIX:  INTERVIEW WITH MR. VERNON BOWMAN 
A.  Prologue 
Due east of county road 58 in Sandborn, Indiana, almost in the middle of 
nowhere, sits the farmhouse of Vernon Hugh Bowman (Bowman).   Bowman is a 
soybean farmer.  But, he is better known as the petitioner in the Supreme Court 
case, Bowman v. Monsanto, No. 11-796.  I conducted an interview143 with Bowman 
at his Sandborn farmhouse on March 24, 2013.  The work product of the interview 
included my handwritten notes, and audio and video recordings.  Through a prism 
of Bowman’s brief biographical sketch, the interview provides a slice of traditional 
farm life.  In addition, the interview sheds light on aspects of Bowman’s litigation 
with Monsanto by unearthing unexplored vignettes of traditional framing practices 
that have never been part of the Court’s purview.  The description below 
paraphrases our discussion over a period of a long afternoon that continued through 
early evening. 
B.  The Farmer:  Vernon Bowman 
Born in 1937, Bowman never intended to be a soybean farmer.  He was also 
not sure what career path to pursue.  Growing up, school was not very interesting to 
him.  He chose the outdoors instead, and undoubtedly, was a freethinking youth 
that swam against the orthodoxy.  He stated that his father “badgered” him to go to 
college, so he chose Purdue University.  He graduated with a degree in Agro 
Science in 1959 and, in the process, “proved everyone wrong who had doubted 
whether he would graduate.”  It is there in West Lafayette, Indiana, that his love of 
logic and reasoning grew.  He had recognized the power of scientific knowledge 
that he applied later in his farming practices.  Still unsure of his future upon 
graduation, he joined the ROTC and was drafted into the Army.  He was stationed 
at Fort Dix in Trenton, New Jersey, from 1960 through 1962, where he served as a 
bookkeeper for the Army Officers Corp.  
Upon returning from the Army, he worked in the Ohio area as a fertilizer 
salesman, while dabbling in the real estate business in and around his hometown of 
Sandborn.  During these years, while helping his father and uncle with planting, 
sowing, and maintaining the farm, Bowman developed his passion for farming and 
ultimately began farming full-time.  At one point, the Bowman family had more 
than 600 acres of farmland where they planted soybean and wheat. 
                                                                                                     
 143. Interview with Mr. Vernon Hugh Bowman, Sandborn, Indiana (March 24, 2013) (interview on 
file with the author). 
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Upon his father’s passing, Bowman entered into a joint venture with a fellow 
farmer.  The venture proved disastrous during the 1980s, however, and Bowman 
“became broke.”  Forced to sell several plots of land, the remaining 300 acres of 
land became his sole focus.  His current residence on 12676 North Bowman Road 
is part of this acreage.  Bowman is not a rich farmer.  He half-jokingly considers 
himself a “gardener.”  For several decades, he has made a meager living.  He stated 
that he has no debt, as he has “no expensive habits.”  So, even after going broke, he 
was able to keep on farming—albeit, at a scaled-down level.  
Bowman never married and has no children.  He was extremely close to his 
mother, who died about seven years ago.  He is also very close to his younger 
sister, Sharon, who resides in Danville, Indiana.  Bowman wonders about the future 
and when he will have to stop farming.  When asked if he loses any sleep over the 
current case before the Supreme Court, he replied, “surprisingly, no.  I have not 
even had a nightmare about it.  I am prepared to lose 9-0.” 
At the end of the interview, Bowman showed me his farmland, equipment, and 
soybeans.  I documented them with photos, and I enjoyed watching his two dogs 
playing in the snow on the land surrounding the farm.  He will be preparing to plant 
again in April 2013.  As I report this, I have made plans to return to witness the 
planting and do a follow-up interview.  
Bowman lives by rigid principles, and possesses a commendable moral 
contour coupled with the courage of conviction.  This is what has driven him to 
continue his fight against a corporate giant, despite the fact that many of his fellow 
farmers have either submitted to Monsanto’s demands or have been  forced to settle 
rather than litigate.  This is what makes Bowman’s story compelling.  It is a story 
that must be told. 
C.  Sample Questions Posed to Bowman, and His Responses 
1. What is your view on traditional farming practice? 
For years farmers have relied on local seed suppliers.  It all changed when 
Monsanto came along with their Roundup Ready variant.  These are costlier, but do 
produce a good amount of bushels.  So, I don’t mind paying the premium price for 
my first planting, and I have been purchasing from Pioneer [a registered seed 
producer of Monsanto].  But, since nothing is guaranteed for the second planting, 
we farmers would never pay premium.  
2. Why did you buy from the Elevator and not from Pioneer? 
Farmers do not want to buy from the dealer for the second planting, as the 
planting would really be a hit and miss.  We all know, Elevators [the local grain 
silo] seeds are junk seed, because it has no quality control.  You never know what 
you will get, as they contain mixed seeds with different maturities.  Think about it.  
These are commodity seeds—mixed collection from different local growers.  I have 
been buying this junk seed for my second planting, which I know has a lower 
chance of crop generation due to the timing.  This is a typical practice by local 
farmers.  Don’t rely on me.  Go, ask any farmer.  Even ask the Huey Elevator folks 
that sold me the seeds for my second planting.  
3. Do you think you have made a mistake? Do you think you have infringed on 
Monsanto’s patent? 
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If I am wrong, I am okay with someone telling me I am wrong.  I had even 
gone to several farmers meetings and asked about what I was doing with the 
elevator grain.  No one had said that there was any problem.  So, here in this 
farming community, buying seed from the Elevator for the second planting is a 
common practice – farmers have been doing it for a long time.  When two 
investigators from Monsanto came to speak with me towards the end of 2006, I did 
not hide anything.  I told them what I was doing.  Even the Elevator should have 
informed me and all the farmers.  
I see two things are happening here.  First, Monsanto is forcing their patent on 
me.  Second, by allowing the Elevators to sell seeds they have already abandoned 
their patent claim.  In my mind, the very moment Monsanto allowed the Elevator to 
mix seeds with no accountability, they have given up on their patent. How can they 
sue me for infringement?  So, instead of suing me, they should sue the Elevator 
first.  But, they know, they may not stand on solid ground, as they have already 
abandoned their patent rights.  
So, I don’t think, I had violated any patent right. I am still baffled, that no one 
has been able to explain this in clear terms. You should not be able to reclaim your 
patent once you have abandoned it.  
4. Why don’t farmers rush to the Elevator to purchase seeds?   
The Oral arguments in the Supreme Court seem to suggest that  
this might be a real possibility if they let you get off completely free. 
Farmers don’t use elevator seed all the time, because it is junk seed.  It is a 
cheaper for us, but it is of mixed variety, so you are not sure of its quality. You are 
not even sure of their relative maturities, so you can’t even plan properly.  So, if 
you are a legitimate farmer, you don’t want to use such seeds for your primary 
planting. It is a guessing game, as you don’t know whether you will get any crop at 
all.  Even if you get some, you would not know what value would be there.  Also, 
you spray with weed control because you don’t know what the mixed elevator 
seeds have in them.  So, why should we give the big company premium price for 
something we are not even sure will sprout? 
5. Can you please take me through the timeline of your seed planting  
and the differences between the types of seeds in question again,  
as it seems there was confusion on these issues at oral argument. 
Over the years, I have purchased high quality soybean seeds from Monsanto’s 
approved seed producer, Pioneer.  These are costlier seeds, and generally expected 
to produce a quality crop that farmers can sale.  Typically, these seeds are planted 
in April as the first crop, and subsequently harvested around October.  This is 
considered the first and the best crop. 
Some of us farmers would try to get a second crop.  They would be planted 
approximately a month later.  Farmers who plant this second crop know that there 
is a very high chance it would be a failure, as they would produce minimal to no 
crop worth selling.  Because this crop is planted later in the season, soil quality, 
rain, temperature, and other factors make this a very risky crop to plant.  Also, once 
you buy it from the Elevator, you have no idea of [its] maturity, as they have 
different maturities mixed in them.  So, how do I manage my risk of crop failure?  I 
chose to purchase a much less quality seed, because it is cheaper.  The cheapest 
seed to choose for this second planting is the Elevator seed.  Ask any farmer you 
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would like.  They will tell you that we are completely clueless as to what will be 
produced from these seeds.  They could easily be used for cattle feed.  That’s why 
these throwaway seeds are called junk seeds and they are cheaper.  
6. Why do you think buying junk seeds for planting is not patent infringement? 
I have been doing this for decades now.  See, junk seeds have no fixed 
identity.  It is not possible to separate them once they are mixed in.  You cannot 
count and trace their biological lineage and pay companies accordingly.  You 
would not know whether they came from Monsanto or from the farmer down the 
road.  So, I felt there were no patents in it to worry about.  So, I did not think the 
Elevator seeds had restrictions in it.   
D.  Author’s Commentary 
What brings Bowman to the highest Court in the land?  Is he in violation of 
Monsanto’s patent right by practicing what he has done over several decades?  The 
answers reside at the grey area intersecting the legal contour with the trajectory of 
justice.  In examining whether Bowman has infringed on anyone’s patent rights, we 
must attempt to conceptualize two other related rights.  The first involves the 
farmer’s right to protect his livelihood by employing an adequate risk management 
practice. The second involves a community’s right to practice and protect a 
traditional way of life.  After all, if a corporation is allowed various protections 
within the law, why isn’t an individual farmer allowed such extended legal 
protection?  Yet, often times, in its inability to extricate itself from the narrow 
formalism of property rights, law’s evolution ignores the consequentialism of 
justice.  Whether or not Bowman has violated anyone’s right is a complex question 
that must be evaluated within the context of the “rights intersection.”  
Finally, Bowman v. Monsanto is emblematic of a much deeper problem with 
the contemporary patent paradigm—one that is out of touch with the public justice 
construct in emerging economies.144  Here, there are many issues to consider.  Why 
didn’t Monsanto go after the Elevator that mixed in Monsanto’s RR seeds with the 
other variety seeds?  Could there be a legitimate argument indexed at Monsanto’s 
patent abandonment in their relationship with the Elevator, as Monsanto never 
prevented the Elevator from comingling their RR seed with the other seeds?  
Should patent law be so blind to justice that its strict property rights based 
invocation might permanently transform traditional ways of life?  Will the Court 
consider these issues before rendering its verdict? 
E.  Epilogue 
We shook hands.  I thanked Bowman for his time.  He was gracious, polite, but 
in a hurry to get to the only open diner in town before it closed.  It was several 
miles away.  He wanted a sandwich.  
As I pulled away, I scanned Bowman’s remaining acres, the rusting farm 
equipment, and the isolation in the midst of the Midwest prairie. I was alarmed by 
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the stark reality of an American past slowly waning into the future of corporatized 
farming—a future that is obliterating the last vestiges of the American farmer. 
